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Article rightly identifies opportunity to set global example but fails to grasp significance of encryption and extraterritorial powers.

In a recent Leader and article, The Economist correctly describes the draft Investigatory Powers Bill as a potential global “model of how to balance security and freedom”. The draft Bill, which is currently under scrutiny by a Joint Parliamentary Committee of MPs and Peers, is an attempt to update outdated legislation on surveillance and provide a legal basis for activities such as interception, bulk collection and equipment interference.

However, we must disagree with the description of the legitimate concerns of the tech industry about the draft Bill as mere “posturing”. In a number of key areas the draft Bill must do more to provide the clarity that industry needs in order to support the security services with their vital work. If this clarity is not provided, the UK runs the risk of stunting the evolution and growth of the technology sector, whilst making us less safe in the long term.

Take the issue of encryption. Despite the Home Office’s attempted reassurances to industry that the draft Bill does not seek to weaken or undermine encryption, provisions relating to the “removal of electronic protection” require further scrutiny and understanding as to their effects on the use of end to end encryption. Although The Economist claims that the draft Bill does not seek to “force technology companies to install back doors in their encryption software”, it is still unclear whether proposals relating to bulk equipment interference threaten the integrity of products and services. These important questions and concerns will have serious ramifications for users and developers of smart devices as we move into an ever more connected world.

Disappointingly, the article refers to concerns regarding the extraterritorial provisions in the draft Bill as “somewhat overblown”. This could not be further from the truth. The draft Bill in its current form extends extraterritorial jurisdiction to seven of the eight major powers afforded to the security services with inconsistent protections around reasonableness and conflicts of law, as well as enforcement. Together, these powers broadly and unilaterally assert UK jurisdiction overseas, infringe on the sovereign rights of other governments and risk retaliatory action against UK companies operating abroad.

Sir Nigel Sheinwald, the Prime Minister’s special envoy on matters of jurisdiction, has rightly recognised these legitimate concerns. In his report to the Prime Minister, he recommended that the Government lead the way in creating a legal framework for data sharing. To call these concerns “overblown”, when the Prime Minister’s own envoy recognises their legitimacy, ignores the fact that domestic surveillance laws should not unilaterally over-reach and limit the sovereign rights of other countries.

The tech industry takes its responsibilities to help the security services, where lawful, in their vital work very seriously. In fact, the vast majority of counter-terrorism operations would not succeed without the help of the tech sector. This is why the security services need a clear legal structure that enables them to operate in the digital era, and why serious concerns regarding some provisions in the draft Bill require proper consideration and scrutiny.