WIREDGOV

An established Ukrainian F-16 Fighter Wing and the overstretch of fighters and air defences on both sides by sustained long-range strike campaigns have changed the nature of the air war.

The first phase of the air war during Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was characterised by the failure of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) to successfully complete a suppression and destruction of enemy air defences (SEAD/DEAD) campaign against Ukraine’s extensive ground-based air defence (GBAD) network. This left the bulk of the VKS tactical fighter fleets unable to meaningfully effect the direction of the war on the ground. Instead, the bulk of Russia’s air campaign in the first two years consisted of long-range strikes using cruise and ballistic missiles to try to degrade Ukrainian communications, defence industry and transport and energy infrastructure. Likewise, the impact that badly outmatched Soviet-legacy Ukrainian fighters and ground attack aircraft could have on the frontline situation was limited by a formidable Russian GBAD threat and VKS fighters on combat air patrol fairly near the frontlines.

In summer 2026, the nature of the air war is radically different. Western fighters now form the core of the Ukrainian Air Force in the shape of the 107th Wing, equipped with F-16, and a smaller force of Mirage 2000-5s. The F-16s are by some margin the most flexible and effective fighters available, across all mission types. Ukraine also still operates some MiG-29s and a few Su-27s for air defence missions, firing AGM-88 HARM missiles to suppress Russian GBAD systems and conducting glide bomb attacks. Air defence sorties make up the most common mission type, which is understandable given that throughout most of 2025 and 2026, Russia has launched several massed long-range strike waves per week. These strikes generally begin with waves of many hundreds of one-way attack (OWA) drones such as the propellor powered Geran-2 and jet-powered Geran-3, as well as decoy drones such as the Gerbera to probe and saturate Ukrainian air defences. The drones are followed closely by tens of cruise missiles such as the Kh-101 launched from Russian bombers and 9M728 from the ground-based Iskander-K; and around half-to-one-third that number of ballistic missiles such as 9M723 from the Iskander-M and the air-launched Kh-47M2 Kinzhal.

As a first line of defence against these complex massed attacks, Ukrainian forces deploy deep belts of cheap short-ranged air defence (SHORAD) systems manned by mobile air defence teams. These SHORAD defences include anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) from manually aimed vehicle mounted machine guns, automated and crewed turret emplacements and self-propelled anti-aircraft guns like the Gepard and Shilka. Air defence teams also use man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) like Stinger and Igla, and many thousands of drone interceptors. The latter are essentially cheap propellor powered missiles and come in a very wide variety of forms, many of which are increasingly effective against multiple classes of Russian OWA and battlefield reconnaissance UAVs.

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