Army 2020
11 Jun 2014 02:04 PM
Full report: Army 2020
The decision by the MOD to
implement Army 2020, its programme to reduce the size of the regular Army and
increase the number of trained Army reserves, was taken without appropriate
testing of feasibility, according to the National Audit
Office.
In its report to Parliament, the
spending watchdog warns that transition to the new Army structure comes with
significant risks which, if they materialized, could significantly affect the
Army’s ability to achieve its objectives and value for
money.
Under Army 2020, by December
2018 the number of trained regular soldiers in the Army needs to be reduced by
around 20,000 (down from 102,000); and, by the end of 2018-19, the number of
trained reserve soldiers needs to be increased by at least 11,000 (up from
around 19,000). The Department considers that this reduction in size of the
Army will help the Army achieve savings of £10.6 billion over 10 years to
2021-22. The resulting Army would consist of 82,500 regulars and 30,000 trained
reserves. However, the Department did not test whether it was feasible to
recruit and train the required number of reserves by 2018-19.
There has not been a significant
growth in the overall trained strength of the Army reserve in the last two
years. At April 2012, the trained strength was 19,410. In April 2014 it was
19,400. In 2013-14, a total of 3,020 soldiers entered the Army Reserve.Reserve
recruitment targets increase substantially over the next five years. For
example, in 2016-17, the Army will need to recruit 9,270 reserves, including
8,000 new recruits. A significant change in performance is therefore required,
particularly for new reserves, if the Army 2020 structure is to be staffed in
time.
The Army is ahead of target in
its planned reduction of the Regular Army to 82,500 soldiers. (As at April
2014, its trained strength was 87,180). However, recruitment of new regular
soldiers was behind schedule in 2013-14. The Army recruited 6,366 regular
soldiers against a target of 9,715 (a shortfall of 34 per
cent).
The Army’s recruitment
contract with Capita has been subject to a number of difficulties that have
affected recruitment performance, including the MOD’s failure to provide
ICT infrastructure critical to the success of the project.This means poor
recruitment performance cannot be distinguished from the impact of ICT
failings.
The Army has not publicly
detailed what aspects of the transition to Army 2020 it needs to achieve by
when for it to operate effectively. This makes it difficult to measure progress
towards full implementation. The Army has also not set clear trigger points for
enacting any contingency plans. For example, if the reserve recruitment
shortfall persists, there is a risk of staffing gaps in some parts of the Army
structure and increased pressure on regular units.
Other risks include the
significant challenge faced by the Army in implementing Army 2020 alongside
other substantial ‘change programmes’, such as a new Army basing
programme including the return of UK troops from Germany. Army 2020 also seeks,
for the first time, to integrate regulars and reserves fully within a single
force structure. However, 65 per cent of regular Army respondents to a 2014 MOD
survey believe that regular and reserve forces are not well integrated. In
addition, achieving the aims of Army 2020 requires additional funding for
equipment which is not yet guaranteed.
"Army 2020 requires
an overall reduction in the size of the Army and a fundamental change to its
composition, with a significant reduction in the number of regulars and a
substantial increase in the number of trained reserves. Military judgement
played an important role in decisions but committing to moving towards an Army
structure with fewer regular soldiers and an increased number of reserves
within the planned timescale should have been subject to more rigorous testing
of feasibility. The Department and Army must get a better understanding of
significant risks to Army 2020 – notably, the extent to which it is
dependent on other major programmes and the risk that the shortfall in
recruitment of new reserves will up the pressure on regular
units."
Amyas Morse, head of the
National Audit Office, 11 June 2014
Notes for
Editors
82,500
Trained regular Army personnel
planned in December 2018
30,000
Trained Army reserves planned by
the end of the financial year, 2018-19
£10.6bn
Total reduction in the
Army's budget between 2011-12 and 2021-22 102,000 to
82,500
20,000
Planned reduction in regular
Army numbers, down from 102,000, by December 2018
7,947
Army personnel selected for
redundancy between 2011 and May 2014
11,000
Minimum increase in trained Army
reserves, from 19,000, needed by end of 2018-19
1,975
Reserve soldiers recruited by
Capita in 2013-14 against a December 2012 Army Demand Plan requirement of
6,000
3,184
Regular Army training places
unfilled in 2013-14, from a planned allocation of 9,382 places
1. Press notices and reports are
available from the date of publication on the NAO website, which is at
www.nao.org.uk. Hard copies can be obtained by using the relevant links on our
website.
2. The National Audit Office
scrutinises public spending for Parliament and is independent of government.
The Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG), Amyas Morse, is an Officer of
the House of Commons and leads the NAO, which employs some 820 staff. The
C&AG certifies the accounts of all government departments and many other
public sector bodies. He has statutory authority to examine and report to
Parliament on whether departments and the bodies they fund have used their
resources efficiently, effectively, and with economy. Our studies evaluate the
value for money of public spending, nationally and locally. Our recommendations
and reports on good practice help government improve public services, and our
work led to audited savings of almost £1.1 billion in
2013.
3. The Department projected that
its 2011 decision to further reduce the size of the Army to 82,000 would enable
the Army to achieve staffing savings of £5.3 billion over the ten years
from 2012-13 to 2021-22. These savings were in addition to £5.3 billion
of savings already identified by the Strategic Defence and Security Review,
arising from reductions in manpower and equipment budgets. The Department
therefore expected to make overall savings of £10.6
billion