CBRN Supply Chains: The Strategic Enablers Missing from Resilience
16 Nov 2026 02:02 PM
CBRN preparedness depends on dispersed supply chains. Resilience frameworks should recognise them as strategic enablers, even if they are not critical infrastructure.
National resilience strategies place significant emphasis on protecting Critical National Infrastructure, recognising that disruption to essential services can have profound consequences for national security, public safety and economic stability. The UK Government Resilience Framework advocates a whole-of-society approach to resilience and highlights the need to understand systemic interdependencies that could affect national preparedness and response capability.
Recent events, including the Covid-19 pandemic, geopolitical instability and global supply chain disruptions, have demonstrated how rapidly shortages of critical materials, components and specialised products can emerge. The strategic significance of resilience has been reinforced through the Integrated Review Refresh 2023, which emphasises the challenges posed by strategic competition, economic coercion and vulnerabilities associated with globally interconnected systems.
Increasingly, resilience debates are shifting from protecting individual assets towards understanding the interconnected networks that support national capability. Both the EU and NATO have recognised the growing importance of resilience across interconnected sectors, industrial ecosystems and supply networks. The EU's resilience framework specifically acknowledges that increasingly interconnected societies require resilience measures extending beyond the protection of individual infrastructure assets, while NATO emphasises that resilient civil systems are fundamental to both societal and military preparedness.
This challenge is particularly relevant in the CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) domain, where preparedness and response capabilities depend on complex, interconnected and often globally distributed industrial networks. An important policy question therefore emerges: should CBRN supply chains be considered critical infrastructure in their own right, or should they be recognised differently within resilience frameworks?
The answer may lie between these two positions. While CBRN supply chains may not fit traditional critical infrastructure definitions, they should be recognised as strategic enablers whose disruption could significantly degrade national preparedness, emergency response capability and operational resilience.
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