IOPC investigation finds police missed opportunities for intervention before Derbyshire murder

8 Jul 2021 04:32 PM

An Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) investigation into Derbyshire Constabulary’s contact with Graham Snell prior to his murder found opportunities for intervention were missed after he told police that a man staying at his home uninvited was stealing from him.

Police did not run checks which would have revealed that the man he named, Daniel Walsh, was wanted for robbery. Mr Snell, aged 72, disappeared shortly afterwards and Walsh was subsequently arrested and convicted of murdering him.

The force has now accepted learning recommendations from our report aimed at improving guidance around tasking responsibilities for supervisors, and the management and resourcing of incidents. Other recommendations were designed to ensure consistency of training across relevant departments for those processes, along with policies relating to vulnerability and safeguarding. 

Following a referral from Derbyshire Constabulary in July 2019 we independently investigated their contact with Mr Snell prior to his death after visiting Chesterfield Police Station on 19 June that year to report that Daniel Walsh was staying at his home uninvited, and had stolen money from his online bank account. 

In January this year (2021), Walsh was jailed for life at Derby Crown Court, with a minimum term of 27 years, after he was found guilty of murdering Mr Snell. The trial was told that Mr Snell was murdered on 20 June.

Our inquiries focused on how police initially handled Mr Snell’s report, their efforts to contact and safeguard him between 19 and 30 June, and the delays in dealing with the incident.  

Evidence gathered by our investigator indicated that safeguarding opportunities were missed when the enquiry officer who spoke to Mr Snell at the station treated it as anti-social behaviour, although noting that verbal threats had allegedly been made by Walsh and that Mr Snell feared he might be harmed. The enquiry officer and a police constable assigned to visit Mr Snell did not record an offence or carry out checks at that time which would have shown Mr Walsh was wanted and had a history of violence, including violence towards Mr Snell.  

There was no answer when the constable went to Mr Snell’s address on 20 June, and he was then deassigned from the incident. The job remained on a tasking list but we found that due to a systemic error the constable’s supervisor and the control room, which assigned the officer, both thought the other was dealing with it. 

This led to the incident being overlooked until it was randomly audited on 29 June by a control room supervisor. It then took a further 26 hours to deploy officers although the incident was graded as a priority following checks revealing Mr Walsh’s history.

On 30 June the constable who had originally been allocated revisited Mr Snell’s home, hours after a neighbour had reported concern over not seeing him for more than a week.  

IOPC Regional Director Derrick Campbell said: “My sympathies are with the family of Mr Snell and all those affected by his death in the most harrowing of circumstances.

“Our investigation indicates that individuals and the systems used by the force did not recognise or respond appropriately to the risks in this case. There were safeguarding failures and the opportunity to intervene promptly and effectively before Mr Snell was murdered was missed.

Mr Campbell added: “I am pleased that the force has accepted our learning recommendations designed to add clarity around the supervision, tasking and resourcing of incidents to avoid confusion over who is responsible for doing what, and to improve processes and training for carrying out risk assessments and safeguarding vulnerable people.”  

We found that many of the issues were systemic but the force agreed that the enquiry officer who initially dealt with Mr Snell, a member of police staff, had a case to answer for misconduct. However as they resigned from the force during our investigation no further action could be taken.

We also found that the constable who was originally tasked with following up Mr Snell’s report had a case to answer for misconduct for not recording the alleged theft, not carrying out intelligence checks prior to going to his home on 20 June and not considering him as vulnerable. It was agreed with the force that this would be dealt with through management action supported by a detailed performance plan. 

Another officer in a supervisory position has received further training in the management of incidents and tasking lists, although we found no case to answer for misconduct for their actions.

During our investigation, which was completed in eight months, we reviewed relevant national and local policies and guidance in relation to safeguarding and the recording of incidents and crime.

We also studied police incident logs and crime records, and analysed statements provided by the officers we investigated, along with accounts from police witnesses.

Our full learning recommendations and the force’s response to them can be found here.