The Long War: Fighting Beyond the First Battle

21 Oct 2025 12:39 PM

It is irresponsible to conceal the prospect of war from a population you will call on for second and third echelon reinforcements, for whom survival hinges on preparation.

British Army reservists from the 3rd Battalion, Royal Anglian Regiment, conduct simulated urban operations and night attack during Exercise Northern Strike 24-2 at the Combined Armed Collective Training Facility, Camp Grayling, Michigan, 12 August, 2024.

The first of a series of RUSI Military Science outputs in the Long War Programme, this commentary is part of a programme that seeks to examine the cross-domain and cross-government implications – for the UK and its allies – of preparing for and deterring an enduring conflict with Russia.

Wars are rarely short. Despite the hopes of politicians and planners, they often last longer, cost more and claim more lives than anticipated. This has held true from British forces departing for France in 1914, to NATO’s foray into Afghanistan, to Vladimir Putin’s ongoing war against Ukraine. Put simply: very rarely is a war over by Christmas.

As NATO reorientates to face a post-Ukraine Russia, the United Kingdom must resist the institutional impulse to plan for the first battle alone. The next war may not be quick and winning it will demand more than readiness; it will require breadth and depth as a priority to build resilience and political honesty about the realities of prolonged industrial-scale conflict.

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