The US-Saudi Nuclear Deal: Supply Chain and Non-Proliferation Implications

28 Nov 2025 11:13 AM

The US-Saudi nuclear deal will have limited implications for the US nuclear sector but could have meaningful political and non-proliferation consequences for the Middle East.

On 18 November, the US and Saudi Arabia concluded a series of agreements on strategic, defence and economic cooperation. At least two of these agreements are directly relevant to US-Saudi cooperation in the civil nuclear sector, although the precise details of their contents are not yet clear. While any hopes that Saudi Arabia may become a meaningful player in US efforts to diversify its own nuclear supply chain are misplaced, the strategic implications of these agreements should not be underestimated. The details of the deal – critically, whatever non-proliferation provisions are agreed on as part of the deal – will have consequences for the broader region.

Not the Supplier You’re Looking For

Among the series of cooperation agreements concluded by the US and Saudi Arabia last week, at least two appear to directly touch on cooperation in the civil nuclear energy sphere. According to the White House, The Joint Declaration on the Completion of Negotiations on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation ‘builds the legal foundation for a decades-long, multi-billion-dollar nuclear energy partnership with the Kingdom; confirms that the United States and American companies will be the Kingdom’s civil nuclear cooperation partners of choice; and ensures that all cooperation will be conducted in a manner consistent with strong non-proliferation standards.’ Meanwhile, the Strategic Framework for Cooperation on Securing Uranium, Metals, Permanent Magnets, and Critical Minerals Supply Chains will presumably grant the US access in some form to Saudi Arabia’s natural uranium reserves. Though what either of these agreements will look like in practice remains unclear.

Global civil nuclear supply chains are notoriously oligopolistic, with only a small number of commercial and national players operating at each phase of the nuclear fuel cycle. This is in part due to the high threshold to entry into the civil nuclear space, as nuclear technology and materials are highly regulated and tightly controlled as a result of associated proliferation risks. The markets for uranium conversion and enrichment services, the production of nuclear fuel assemblies and the construction of nuclear power plants (NPPs) are today dominated to a large degree (though certainly not monopolised) by Russia. China – which has a thriving domestic nuclear energy – is still a relative new-comer and small player on the export market but is clearly angling to become a heavy-hitter in its own right in global nuclear energy markets. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, this concentration of the market – first and foremost in Russian entities – caused concern over the resilience of Western nuclear supply chains and efforts by Western governments and industry to diversify away from Russian supplies.

In a region where nuclear proliferation concerns are far from theoretical issues, the details matter. So do the players that lead the development of nuclear technology in the region and the precedents they set.

In this context, the entry of new players into the civil nuclear market is a positive development. However, it is worth tempering expectations when it comes to the US-Saudi agreements. Hopes that Saudi Arabia can play any meaningful role in diversifying away from Russian supplies of mined or enriched uranium in US civil nuclear market are at best extremely premature and ultimately misguided. When it comes to mined uranium, Saudi Arabia’s natural uranium deposits are relatively limited. US utilities source most of their natural uranium from Canada, Kazakhstan and Australia. If the US is indeed concerned over future supplies of natural uranium, it would do better to focus on securing access to additional deposits in existing supplier states in Central Asia (namely, Kazakhstan) or on the African continent – regions where Russia has its own ambitions for securing greater access to uranium deposits.

Indeed, the US’ dependency on Russia – and where China looks ready to gain a greater foothold – is first and foremost in relation to the supply of enriched uranium. In 2024, 20% of the enrichment services purchased by US utilities were still Russian. Saudi Arabia does not have – and is not currently expected to receive as part of the agreement – uranium enrichment technology. The set up of new enrichment facilities takes years – that’s not accounting for the time it takes to sort out the necessary regulation before ground is even broken. There are much easier and near-term ways of diversifying away from Russian enriched uranium supply to US and other Western markets, which are already ongoing – namely, the expansion of existing enrichment capacity in Europe and in the US.

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