Uncertainty over how benefit fraud risk will be managed
15 May 2014 11:50 AM
It remains uncertain how
DWP will manage the housing costs element of Universal Credit without increased
risks of fraud and error, warns the Work and Pensions Committee
report.
The Government has stated that
an IT system (the Integrated Risk and Intelligence Service (IRIS)) will allow
it to cross-check data and provide similar safeguards against fraudulent claims
under Universal Credit as are currently operated by local authorities within
the Housing Benefit system.
However, last year the National
Audit Office (NAO) found that IRIS was "missing" from the UC
Pathfinders, and it remains unclear how or when DWP will achieve automated
access to the range of property data currently available to local
authorities. The Committee concludes that such a system will need to be
fully developed and tested before national implementation of Universal Credit
commences.
Committee
Chair
Commenting on the report, the
Chair of the Work and Pensions Committee, Dame Anne Begg MP,
said:
"Through the use of
RTI—real-time information on PAYE earnings—Universal Credit has the
potential over the longer term to substantially reduce fraud and error in the
benefits system. However, this could be seriously undermined because of
the uncertainty about how DWP will administer the housing element of Universal
Credit without increased risks of fraud and error.
Under the current housing
benefit system, local authorities can cross-check claims across a range of data
relating to other council services. Unless DWP is able to cross-check
Universal Credit claims in a similar way it may be less effective in tackling
fraud and error.
It is vital that a fully
developed and tested IT system, which allows DWP to cross-check data, is in
place before Universal Credit is implemented on a national scale.
Worryingly, it appears that there is no automated system in use in the
Pathfinders and is not clear when or how a system will be
available."
Conclusions and
recommendations
On reporting of official fraud
and error estimates
The official estimated benefit
fraud rate is 0.7% of total benefits expenditure. The general public’s
misperception is that it is some 34 times higher. To reduce the risk of
confusion or conflation in media reporting, DWP should publish
statistics relating to the estimated level of benefit fraud on a separate day
from those related to error in the benefits system [paragraph
19].
Dame Anne Begg MP
said:
"Statistics relating to
benefit fraud are often conflated in media reporting with those relating to
error; and people’s perceptions of the level of benefit fraud are
completely out of kilter with the official estimate. This is not helped by the
Government publishing all of the statistics simultaneously. Whilst we
understand that the boundary between claimant error and fraud is not always
clear, we believe that publishing separate summaries of estimated fraud and
error rates would be helpful."
On progress towards fraud and
error reduction targets
Fraud and error rates have
plateaued from 2005/06 to 2012/13, despite an “uncompromising” and
"zero tolerance" approach announced by the coalition Government. DWP
will only meet the target set in 2010, to reduce the estimated overpayment rate
to no more than 1.7% by April 2015, if it employs innovative approaches which
are aligned with the known risk factors associated with each benefit [paragraph
29].
Dame Anne Begg MP
said:
"Despite DWP devoting
considerable effort and resources to fraud and error reduction, rates have
hardly changed since 2005/06 and estimated overpayments remain at around 2% of
total benefit expenditure. If the ambitious target is to be met,
innovative approaches are needed, not more of the same."
On innovative ways of tackling
fraud and error
DWP and HMRC should explore,
with the Payments Council and the banking sector, the feasibility of
establishing a system which flags up potentially incorrect benefits and Tax
Credits payments, usingdata held by payments systems operators and
banks on the types of payments due to enter individual bank accounts
[paragraph 88].
In the longer
term biometric identity systems could have an
important role to play in identity verification processes across government.
The Cabinet Office is working on a government-wide system; the Government
should evaluate the benefits of biometric identity verification in the social
security system and more widely across public services [paragraph
55].
Dame Anne Begg MP
said:
"DWP should adopt a secure
and consistent approach to public and private sector data-sharing. This
should include exploring the feasibility of a system that uses data held by
banks and payment system operators to identify potentially incorrect benefit
payments.
The Government should also
carefully consider innovative identity verification technology, such as the
voice-recognition system now used in Australian public
services."
On the implementation of the
Single Fraud Investigation Service (SFIS)
The Committee recommends
that SFIS, a DWP-run service which will investigate all social
security benefit fraud across DWP, HMRC and local authorities, be implemented,
as far as is practicable, in line with the roll out of Universal
Credit. The Government’s current timetable for SFIS
implementation would see responsibility for Housing Benefit fraud
investigations transfer from local authorities to DWP before the Department
plans to take responsibility for housing costs support under Universal Credit
across the country [paragraph 75].
Dame Anne Begg MP
said:
"SFIS is, in principle, a
good idea but it makes no sense to rush its implementation, ahead of the roll
out of Universal Credit. As far as possible SFIS and Universal Credit
implementation should be aligned, otherwise there could be increased risks of
fraud in relation to housing costs support. The Government also needs to pause
to allow negotiations with local government and the relevant trade unions about
the transfer of staff into DWP."