Buncefield Investigation
Board calls for reforms to land use planning system around major
hazard sites
NEWS DISTRIBUTION
SERVICE News Release (Buncefield) issued by The Government News
Network on 15 July 2008
Issued by the News
Distribution Service on behalf of the Buncefield Independent Major
Incident Investigation
Today, the Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board (MIIB)
has released recommendations on land use planning around major
hazard sites (non-nuclear), with a report that calls for the
system to be updated in order to get the balance right between the
need for strategic facilities such as large scale oil storage
sites and the need for off-site social and economic development.
Lord Tony Newton, Independent Chair of the Buncefield
Investigation Board said: "We believe there are important
benefits to be secured. A more cohesive system, greater
collaboration between interested parties and more refined risk
assessment tools can enable industry to provide the products we
need while maintaining the levels of safety that everyone expects
and avoiding the unnecessary blighting of development opportunities."
The MIIB is asking for a wide-ranging review of the system for
land-use planning around major hazard sites in Britain. The
review is to look into the granting of consents to the site
operators, as well as the planning consents for off-site
developments. Critically, the MIIB is asking for the total
population at risk to be considered for each new application;
currently, the planning system does not consider the cumulative
effect of developments on the so-called societal risk.
The MIIB endorses the fundamental principle that the local
planning authority should be responsible for planning decisions
but observes that the roles of HSE, the Environment Agency and the
Scottish Environment Protection Agency and the site operators in
the planning system should be more aligned with the regulatory
system for ensuring safety and environmental protection at major
hazard sites.
The preferred system is one where the planning authority takes
decisions that are informed by expert technical submissions on
risks and control measures, including from the emergency
responders, with HSE being responsible for the standards of
technical submissions, and for the standards of the controls to be
achieved by the planning decision process.
The MIIB believes that the improvements called for in its
previous reports, for example in reducing the risks of major
incidents through better design and operation of fuel storage
sites should be accounted for in the new system. Currently, the
planning zones around flammable storage sites are not responsive
to changes in risk levels although they are at other types of
major hazard sites, such as chlorine manufacturing plants. The
MIIB is calling for the system in Britain to be more consistent in
the use of quantified risk assessment to inform planning decisions.
Taf Powell, the Buncefield Investigation Manager said:
"Buncefield represents a watershed for the planning system at
major hazard sites in Britain as we identified in our initial
report in July 2006. Land-use planning and societal risk have been
particularly challenging and have taken some time to consider fully.
"The planning system needs overhauling to avoid unnecessary
blight on off-site development whilst giving good assurance of
safety and environmental protection relating to the site.
"The system should in future consider the total population
at risk - societal risk - at each new development application. We
should not continue to allow surrounding populations to increase
without considering the consequences.
"Planning decisions should take account of our other
recommendations for controlling the risks arising from major
hazard sites. Understanding the risks involved is an important
step in reaching decisions and we have made a particular effort in
our report to cast some light on the aspects of risk assessment
and societal risk.
"What we are proposing is a tool for flexible transparent
decision making which we believe will assist in achieving more
consistent outcomes around major hazard sites."
Notes to Editors
1. In this report, the Buncefield Investigation Board gives their
views on how the planning system around major hazard sites could
be improved, in the aftermath of the Buncefield explosions and
fires of 11 December 2005. This work relates to item 5 in the
Investigation's terms of reference, where there is
requirement for the Board to make recommendations for future
action to ensure the effective management and regulation of major
incident risk at COMAH sites. This should include consideration
of off-site as well as on-site risks and consider prevention of
incidents, preparations for response to incidents and mitigation
of their effects. This stems from the Board's Initial
Report, published on 13 July 2006, which identified four principal
workstreams that would form the basis of their continuing work and
developing recommendations. Those workstreams are Design and
Operations (also relating to COMAH); Emergency Preparedness for
and in Response to Incidents (also relating to COMAH); Advice to
Planning Authorities (this report); and Examination of the Health
and Safety Executive's (HSE's) and the Environment
Agency's roles in regulating the activities on the Buncefield site.
2. The HSE and the Environment Agency as the joint Competent
Authority (CA), are the regulatory agencies responsible for
enforcing the COMAH (Control of Major Accident Hazards)
Regulations. The CA assesses the adequacy of the safety reports
submitted and carries out inspections and audits to verify their
content and implementation.
3. The local planning authorities for the Buncefield depot are
Dacorum Borough Council and St. Albans District Council.
4. The Independent Investigations call for the COMAH and land use
planning systems to be increasingly integrated, because they
believe increased burdens on site operators will be minimised. The
costs of risk reduction measures also need to be considered in
relation to the commercial beneficiaries of the measures. The
Board also call for the revised planning system to be
systematically and clearly explained to the general public.
5. The Board have identified a number of primarily technical
issues relating to the assessments that inform land use planning
decisions around major hazard sites. These need to be addressed in
parallel with the wide-ranging review if changes to the system are
to be delivered within 5 years. The Board explain that the
simplified, generic approach to risk assessment currently used
around flammable storage sites needs to be replaced by a site
specific assessment of risks, using QRA methods, leading to a
planning system that is more responsive to the levels of risk
posed by each particular site.
6. This is a necessary response to the improvements in risk
controls. Specific examples are in moving away from expressing
harm in terms of 'dangerous dose or worse' to a risk of
fatality, in aligning the risk assessment in the COMAH safety
report system with land use planning, and in setting priorities on
the management of sites to ensure continuing integrity of the
control measures incorporated in the planning decisions. The
Board also address some of the anomalies attaching to the
hazardous substances consents system, eg on dormant sites.
7. Moving to a QRA approach is also necessary for societal risk
to be taken into account in a consistent way in Britain i.e. to
ensure that broadly similar levels of risk receive broadly similar
responses in the planning system.
8. The Board call on the key stakeholders - some of whom have had
little involvement to date - to demystify the concept of societal
risk and to envisage a future system where they support the
planning authority in coming to transparent decisions on what
level of societal risk can be accepted in a planning application.
This should be subject to guidance on tolerability limits
developed by HSE and agreed nationally. We also call for the
planning authorities to be suitably resourced to develop the
expertise and procedures necessary for their role.
9. The Board commissioned a report from the engineering
consultancy DNV to describe what a risk based system incorporating
societal risk might look like at a flammable storage site. The
results of this work confirmed that a fully risk based land use
planning system around such sites is feasible, and is used
elsewhere in Europe.
10. The Board concludes their report by addressing retrospective
applications of this method since it is inevitable there will be
some places where the societal risk will be of concern due to
developments, which have already taken place. These locations will
need to be managed through a specific and proportionate response.
11. If you have any questions for the Buncefield Major Incident
Investigation Board, please Tel: 020 7717 6909 or email us at,
buncefield.inforequest@hse.gsi.gov.uk Opening times: Monday to
Friday 9:00am to 5:00pm.
To visit the Buncefield Major Investigation website, go to http://www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk.