Foot and Mouth outbreak
in Surrey HSE publishes final report on potential breaches of
biosecurity at the Pirbright site
HEALTH AND SAFETY
EXECUTIVE News Release (E032:07) issued by The Government News
Network on 7 September 2007
The Health and
Safety Executive (HSE) has today published its final report into
potential breaches of biosecurity at the Pirbright site. The
report concludes HSE's investigation following the outbreak
of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) in Surrey on 3 August. The report
can be viewed at: http://www.hse.gov.uk/news/archive/07aug/finalreport.pdf
HSE Chief Executive Geoffrey Podger said:
"During our investigation we established that it was
possible for the live virus strain - O1BFS - to enter the site
effluent drainage system. We judged it likely that waste water
containing the live virus, having entered the drainage pipework,
then leaked out and contaminated the surrounding soil. This
conclusion is supported by evidence of long term damage and
leakage, including cracked pipes, tree roots breaching pipework,
and unsealed manholes. We also believe that excessive rainfall in
July may have increased the potential for virus release from the drain.
"Our report shows that during the period of our
investigation both human and vehicle movements at Pirbright were
not adequately controlled. We conclude that failure to keep
complete records was not in line with accepted practice and
represents a breach in biosecurity at the site. In particular,
vehicles associated with ongoing construction work had relatively
unrestricted access to the site. In our opinion, these
construction activities - very near to the effluent drainage
system - are likely to have caused disturbance and movement of
soil in a way that contaminated some of the vehicles with the live
virus. We established that some of the vehicles, probably
contaminated, drove from the site along a road that passes the
first infected farm. We conclude therefore that this combination
of events is the likely link between the release of the live virus
from Pirbright and the first outbreak of FMD. more
"We have drawn our concerns about the breaches of
biosecurity, together with a number of recommendations, to the
attention of the Pirbright site regulator - Defra - so that they
can be rectified."
HSE and Defra have today issued a co-ordinated safety alert to
employers conducting work on pathogens in hazard groups 3 and 4 as
a reminder of the measures needed to ensure primary and secondary containment.
Geoffrey Podger continued:
"This safety alert is to draw employers' attention to
issues arising from our investigation which need wider
dissemination and action. Although these issues already form part
of the basis on which such sites are permitted to operate, the
purpose of the alert is simply to remind operators of their
obligations. Both HSE and Defra will be reviewing these issues
during their usual regulatory visits with the priority attention
focused on sites handling hazard group 4 pathogens."
HSE led the investigation given its investigatory expertise and
parallel experience as the biosecurity regulator of human pathogen
laboratories. HSE does not regulate any part of the Pirbright site
in this respect.
Three organisations operating at the site - the Institute for
Animal Health (IAH), Merial Animal Health Ltd (Merial) and
Stabilitech Ltd (Stabilitech) - all worked with varying amounts of
the live virus strain - O1BFS - that caused FMD in the first
infected herd in Surrey. Results of sequencing tests commissioned
as part of the investigation indicate that this strain is highly
likely to have originated from the Pirbright site. However, due to
very small differences in the strains used by the three
organisations, it has not been possible to pinpoint precisely the
exact origin of the virus found in the infected animals.
The HSE final report also addresses lines of enquiry that had
focused on other containment arrangements at Pirbright, namely
solid waste disposal, airborne routes through the fabric of site
buildings or faults in filtration, and human movements.
HSE concludes that there was no evidence of:
* any breakdown of containment systems for solid waste disposal
at Pirbright;
* a biosecurity failure that could have led to the virus strain
being released from the site to the atmosphere; and
* biosecurity arrangements having been breached through the
malicious intent of staff.
This has been a complex, thorough and exhaustive investigation
carried out and completed within four weeks.
Notes to Editors
1. HSE's report, submitted to the Secretary of State for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs on 31 August, builds on the
findings from an initial report published on 7 August. The HSE-led
team was charged with investigating potential breaches of
biosecurity at the Pirbright site, whether such breaches may have
led to a release of any specified animal pathogen, and whether any
such breaches had been rectified to prevent future incidents.
2. Following the outbreak of FMD in Surrey on 3 August, the
Government asked HSE to lead an investigation into biosecurity
issues at the Pirbright facility. This site is occupied by the
Institute for Animal Health (IAH) and two private companies,
Merial and Stabilitech. This investigation involved support from
relevant experts, including those from Defra, the Veterinary
Medicines Directorate, the Health Protection Agency and the
Environment Agency. HSE also called upon support from Surrey
Police; the Central Science Laboratory; National Veterinary
Institute (Lindholm, Denmark); the Meteorological Office, and the
Health and Safety Laboratory. Professor Brian Spratt of Imperial
College, London, and his team provided independent assessment of
test results.
3. The HSE and Defra safety alert can be found at: http://www.hse.gov.uk/news/archive/07aug/safetyalert.htm
4. HSE's initial report was submitted to Government and
published on 7 August and can be found at http://www.hse.gov.uk/news/archive/07aug/pirbright.htm
This outlined the key routes of the investigation, which included
identifying the virus strain, the potential for airborne and/or
waterborne release of virus from the site, and the potential for
release from the site by human movements.
5. The primary legal requirement applying to the Pirbright site
is the Specified Animal Pathogens Order 1998, enforced by Defra,
which requires licensing of work with the FMD virus. HSE's
primary remit is to regulate the health and safety of staff at the
IAH and Merial sites and to regulate (jointly with Defra) human
health and environmental risks from work involving genetically
modified organisms at IAH.
6. Biological agents such as viruses are classified into one of
four hazard groups (HG) based on their ability to infect healthy
humans. The four groups are as follows:
HG1 - unlikely to cause human disease;
HG2 - can cause human disease and may be a hazard to employees;
it is unlikely to spread to the community and there is usually
effective prophylaxis or treatment available;
HG3 - can cause severe human disease and may be a serious hazard
to employees; it may be spread to the community, but there is
usually effective prophylaxis or treatment available; and
HG4 - causes severe human disease and is a serious hazard to
employees; it is likely to spread to the community and there is
usually no effective prophylaxis or treatment available.
For more information see http://www.hse.gov.uk/biosafety/information.htm#a1
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