COMPETITION
COMMISSION News Release (61/07) issued by The Government News
Network on 31 October 2007
The UK groceries
market is delivering a good deal for consumers but action is
needed to improve competition in a number of local markets and to
address relationships between retailers and their suppliers, the
Competition Commission (CC) has provisionally concluded.
In its provisional findings report, published today, the CC
states that a lack of competition in certain local markets not
only disadvantages consumers in those areas but also allows
retailers to weaken their offer to consumers nationally. Further,
some retailer land holdings and other practices, such as
restrictive covenants, mean that competition is not as effective
as it could be in a number of areas.
The CC is also concerned about the ability of grocery retailers
to transfer excessive risk and costs to suppliers through various
purchasing practices, such as retrospective changes to supply
agreements. The CC considers that these practices could damage
investment and innovation in the supply chain to the ultimate
detriment of consumers.
The CC will now consider a range of measures to address these
concerns before deciding on its final remedies. Options under
consideration include the lifting of restrictive covenants and
exclusivity arrangements, sales of land holdings, and recommending
changes to the planning system to place greater weight on
competition and choice. The CC will also consider changes to the
Supermarkets Code of Practice (SCOP), which regulates
retailer-supplier relationships.
Peter Freeman, Chairman of the CC and Inquiry Group Chairman
said:
Our focus throughout this inquiry has been whether
consumers are receiving the benefits of vigorous competition, such
as value, choice, innovation and convenience-and on most counts
the groceries market delivers just that. However, we feel that
consumers could be even better served.
Having looked in detail at local grocery markets, in most areas
shoppers have a good choice and benefit from the strong
competition between retailers, but in a number of local areas more
competition would benefit consumers both locally and more generally.
We are concerned that retailers could be using existing land
holdings and restrictive covenants to frustrate potential
competition. Further, whilst we understand that the planning
system has to balance conflicting demands, not all of which favour
development, it can act as a barrier to new competing stores.
We have looked carefully at the concerns that have been raised
with us regarding small shops. The evidence is that convenience
stores and specialist grocers that provide consumers with a strong
retail offer will prosper. This is not to say that life is easy
for small retailers, but we do not see evidence of unfair
distortions in competition between large grocery retailers and
small stores.
We do have concerns about aspects of the way retailers deal with
their suppliers, which, if left unchecked, could harm consumers.
We are concerned that the transfer of unexpected costs and
excessive risk on to suppliers is likely to affect their ability
to invest and innovate, which could then adversely affect product
quality and innovation for consumers. Whilst the Code of Practice
does have some effect, it does not entirely prevent the potential harm.
As a result of these concerns, we have published a list of
potential measures to enhance and preserve competition which we
will now look to discuss with all interested parties before we
publish our final report next year.
The CC has carried out an exhaustive inquiry into all aspects of
the groceries market, having received over 550 submissions; held
65 hearings with main and third parties; undertaken three separate
surveys as well as analysing existing data and research covering
the whole industry; collected a dataset of 14,000 grocery stores
and published 26 working papers.
A summary of the findings and possible remedies is as follows:
Findings
Market definition
* Precise market definition will differ
across local geographic markets but there are three major product
markets: larger grocery stores (ie stores larger than 1,000-2,000
sq metres) which compete with stores of the same size; mid-sized
stores, (ie all stores larger than 280 sq metres) which compete
with both mid-sized and larger stores; and convenience stores,
which compete with grocery stores of all sizes. To analyse
collectively a large number of local markets, we have used the
lower size thresholds of 280 sq metres for mid-sized stores and
1,400 sq metres for larger stores.
* The geographic market for
the supply of groceries by grocery retailers is local-larger
stores compete with other larger stores within a 10- to 15-minute
drive-time, with the distance between competing stores in the same
local market progressively reducing for smaller
stores.
Concentration
* A significant number of local
markets have high levels of concentration, which have persisted
over a number of years. Weak competition in local markets lets
grocery retailers weaken their retail offer in all of the markets
in which they operate, as well as in those individual markets
where competition is weak.
Barriers to entry
* The four largest grocery retailers own a
significant number of landbank sites, as well as controlling
further sites through leases to third parties, restrictive
covenants and exclusivity arrangements.
* In many cases, these
landbank sites represent a pipeline of future development activity
that does not raise competition concerns. However, approximately
10 per cent of all larger grocery stores in highly-concentrated
local markets have a nearby landsite which is controlled by the
retailer and is likely to be constraining entry by competitors. In
addition, there are instances of local markets where controlled
land holdings, particularly the use of restrictive covenants, may
be constraining entry by convenience stores.
* The planning
regime aims to promote a series of public interest objectives such
as orderly growth and development of existing town centres and the
provision of a wide range of services in a pleasant and widely
accessible environment. Nevertheless, the planning system for
retail development and the manner in which it is applied by local
planning authorities also acts as a barrier to entry or expansion,
by limiting construction of new stores on out-of-centre or
edge-of-centre sites, and by imposing costs and risks on smaller
retailers and potential entrants.
* The economies of scale
resulting from the distribution systems of the national grocery
retailers, as well as the significant purchasing cost advantages
held by larger retailers, are likely to act as a barrier to entry
or expansion by smaller retailers and new entrants. However, the
presence of the grocery wholesaling sector mitigates the
detrimental effects of this barrier on smaller retailers and new
entrants.
* Tesco is not in such a strong position that other
retailers cannot compete. Expansion by other grocery retailers
continues, which suggests that Tesco's purchasing cost
advantage, share of national grocery sales or expansion into
convenience store retailing is not acting as a barrier to
expansion by other grocery retailers.
Effects on convenience stores and smaller retailers
*
Below-cost selling by national retailers is not part of a
predatory strategy aimed at convenience stores or specialist
stores and is not having significant unintended effects on smaller
stores.
* There is insufficient evidence to conclude that
local vouchering is being used by larger grocery retailers with
any intention beyond that of normal competitive behaviour.
*
The characteristics of UK grocery retailing that we observe do not
support the argument that a 'waterbed' effect is
distorting competition between large and small retailers. Large
retailers do not always get the best price from suppliers. In
addition, convenience and specialist store numbers are not in such
a state of decline to suggest that a waterbed effect exists.
*
There is no evidence to suggest that the financial viability of
the wholesaler sector is seriously under threat. In addition,
consolidation at the wholesale level is unlikely to damage the
competitiveness of the convenience store sector.
Coordination between grocery retailers
* We have not seen
direct evidence of tacit coordination between grocery retailers.
However, given the structure of the grocery retailing market, such
conduct might arise in the future. In particular, practices such
as category management are capable of facilitating exchanges of
information between retailers.
* Our review of emails between
Asda and Tesco and their suppliers shows that suppliers facilitate
the exchange of information on retail prices charged by rival
retailers. Further consolidation among suppliers may be a cause
for concern if it is likely to facilitate coordination, but there
is no direct evidence of tacit coordination at present.
Supply chain
* There are no systemic problems with the
financial viability of UK food and drink manufacturers, nor are
there significant barriers to entry or expansion for small grocery
suppliers.
* Trends in supplier investment or product
innovation in the UK are positive, but we have concerns about the
effect of practices carried out by grocery retailers that transfer
risks and increase costs to suppliers on future levels of
investment and innovation. Each of the national grocery retailers,
and some symbol groups, are likely to have buyer power with
respect to at least some of their suppliers. The SCOP appears, at
least to some extent, to be constraining the exercise of buyer
power by the retailers to which it applies.
* There is no
evidence to suggest that the sale of own-label products by grocery
retailers is giving rise to material competition
concerns.
Possible remedies
* Require grocery retailers to
divest land holdings in areas where concentration is weak.
*
Prohibit grocery retailers from using restrictive covenants or
exclusivity arrangements that reduce the likelihood of land being
used for a competing supermarket.
* Recommend changes to the
planning system that would provide greater opportunities for
developments on the edge of town centres, while maintaining
constraints on out-of-town developments.
* Introduce a
competition test that would allow the existing local position of a
grocery retailer to be taken into account in planning
decisions.
* Include more retailers in the scope of the SCOP,
tightening of various provisions within the SCOP and changing
arrangements for its monitoring.
The CC would like to hear from all interested parties, in writing
about both the provisional findings report (by 30 November 2007)
and the notice of possible remedies (by 23 November 2007). To
submit evidence, please email: Groceries@cc.gsi.gov.uk or write to:
The Inquiry Secretary
(Groceries Market
Investigation)
Competition Commission
Victoria
House
Southampton Row
LONDON
WC1B 4AD
Notes for editors
1. Under the Enterprise Act 2002 the Office
of Fair Trading (OFT) can make a market investigation reference to
the CC if it has reasonable grounds for suspecting that
competition is not working effectively in that market.
2. The inquiry was referred by the OFT on 9 May 2006. This market
reference follows an initial OFT study into the sector and public consultation.
3. The CC is considering whether features of this market or
markets prevent, restrict or distort competition. If so, it will
find an adverse effect on competition and consider whether action
should be taken to remedy or prevent the adverse effect or any
resulting adverse effect on customers in the form of higher
prices, lower quality or less choice of goods and services, or
less innovation. The CC is required to publish its final report by
8 May 2008.
4. The members of the Inquiry Group are: Peter Freeman (Group
Chairman), Jayne Almond, Barbara Donoghue, Alan Gregory, Alan
Hamlin and Bruce Lyons. The Inquiry Director is Andrew Taylor.
5. Further information on the CC and its procedures, including
its policy on the provision of information and the disclosure of
evidence, can be obtained from its website at: http://www.competition-commission.org.uk.