MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
News Release (114/2008) issued by The Government News Network on 12
June 2008
The MoD published
today the Board of Inquiry (BOI) report into the tragic loss of
two Royal Naval Submariners, and the injury of a third, following
an explosion onboard HMS Tireless on 21 March 2007. The two
personnel who died onboard HMS Tireless were Leading Operator
Mechanic Paul McCann and Operator Mechanic Anthony Huntrod.
The BOI concluded that the explosion onboard the submarine was
caused by a faulty self-contained oxygen generator (SCOG) - part
of the back-up oxygen generation system - which was lit during a
routine drill.
The Board has not determined precisely what caused the oxygen
generator to explode. Their report identified the most likely
cause as significant internal contamination of the SCOG canister
with oil, possibly exacerbated by cracking within the canister.
The BOI concluded that the contamination could have occurred in
storage on land or onboard submarines, with the latter being the
most likely source.
Des Browne, Secretary of State for Defence, said:
"At what I realise is a very difficult time, I would like to
express my deepest sympathies to the families, friends and
colleagues of the two submariners who died. I would also like to
apologise to them for those departmental failings identified by
the Board of Inquiry which contributed to this tragic incident.
The Board of Inquiry report made a number of recommendations, all
of which have been accepted and are being implemented. I would
like to make clear that everything possible is being done to
ensure that this cannot happen again."
Admiral Sir Jonathon Band, First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval
Staff, said:
"The loss of any member of the Royal Navy is felt deeply
across the entire Service and I would like to pass on my
sympathies, and those of the rest of the Royal Navy, to the
families, friends and colleagues of Leading Operator Maintainer
Paul McCann and Operator Maintainer Anthony Huntrod, who died in
this tragic accident.
"I would also like to pay tribute to the sheer
professionalism demonstrated by Ship's Company of HMS
Tireless in what were very challenging circumstances and which
ensured that the submarine initially surfaced from under the ice
and was then brought back to port safely. Their courage and
teamwork reinforces my confidence in the ability of the personnel
of the submarine flotilla to uphold the highest standards of the
Service. They can all be justifiably proud of their actions."
Following the HMS Tireless incident, the Department restricted
the use of SCOGs in all submarines to emergency use only. The BOI
has subsequently made 35 recommendations to ensure safety measures
are incorporated. Implementation of these recommendations is
underway and progress has been made. Since the incident, the
Royal Navy and MoD have:
* issued more detailed guidance on SCOG hazards;
* improved
SCOG quality-control checks; and
* issued stricter
instructions for SCOG storage, transport and stowage.
The Royal Navy's submarine flotilla maintains full
operational capability and capacity.
Notes to Editors:
1. Self-Contained Oxygen Generators (SCOGs) are designed
primarily for the provision of oxygen to survivors of disabled
submarines, but they are also used to maintain oxygen levels when
the main oxygen generators are offline. In normal and tactical
operating situations, oxygen is produced by Low Pressure
Electrolysers (LPEs), which generate oxygen throughout the
submarine. In certain situations though - such as an escape
scenario or in under-ice operations where low sea water
temperatures affect LPE availability - SCOGS can be employed to
maintain correct oxygen levels within submarines.
2. The next of kin have been kept informed of the BOI's
findings throughout the process and have received today a copy of
the redacted BOI report. The redacted BOI report can be found on
the MOD website (from 1215) at: http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/BoardsOfInquiry/