INDEPENDENT POLICE
COMPLAINTS COMMISSION News Release issued by The Government News
Network on 8 November 2007
Stockwell 1 - the recommendations
The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) made 16
recommendations for change to the police service as a result of
the Stockwell investigation. These recommendations were addressed
to HMIC, Home Office, ACPO and the MPS.
In drawing up these recommendations the IPCC has worked closely
with Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC.)
The recommendations were:
POLICE USE OF FIREARMS
Command & control
1] Concern
Despite Commander DICK making it clear she was in command of all
aspects of the firearms operation there remains the potential for
confusion between the respective roles of Gold, Silver and
Designated Senior Officer.
Recommendation HMIC
To review existing policy and guidance in relation to the command
and control of firearms operations to ensure there is absolute
clarity of role and responsibility within the chain of command,
particularly when a Designated Senior Officer is deployed. This
should include deployments conducted under the auspices of
Operations Kratos and Operation C.
2] Concern
Despite being appointed as the Designated Senior Officer, the
strategic briefing chaired by Commander MCDOWALL commenced before
Commander DICK's arrival due to inaccurate information being
provided to her regarding the location of where the briefing was
to be held.
Recommendation HMIC
To review existing guidance and practice to ensure Gold, Silver
and Bronze commanders have a clear and common understanding of the
circumstances surrounding future firearms operations, the overall
strategy and the key tactical options under consideration.
3] Concern
No formal recording was made of any of the briefings prior to the
deployment of firearms and surveillance officers. Thereafter there
was no audio recording of what was communicated within the
Operations Room. Such recordings would have provided an audit
trail regarding the information that was received by the room and
the decisions that were then transmitted. Some staff working in
the Operations Room expressed concerns regarding the noise
generated within it and how that may have affected its effectiveness.
Recommendation HMIC
To review existing practice to ensure that at a corporate level
robust and appropriate facilities and mechanisms exist to maintain
the effective command and control of future operations of a
similar nature. Particular attention should be paid to ensuring
that key briefings, strategic and tactical decisions are fully
recorded or documented and in any event capable of audit.
4] Concern
The strategy set by the Gold Commander was not implemented. The
strategy made it clear that all persons leaving Scotia Road would
be stopped either as suspects or as potential intelligence
sources. Six persons left the flats before Mr De Menezes. Due to
insufficient resources being in place, none were stopped.
Recommendation HMIC
To review the existing mechanisms and policy for ensuring that
sufficient and robust channels of communication exist that provide
commanders with 'real-time' updates on intelligence,
operational and resourcing issues that could adversely impact the
successfully implementation of the overall strategic parameters
and the identified tactical options and that robust procedures are
in place to ensure that the necessary fast-time action is taken in
the early stages of an incident to achieve this.
5] Concern
There was no threat assessment and the risk assessments
undertaken for this operation did not consider the risk of
misidentification or uncertainty regarding the identification of a
suspect. The assessment did not consider a suspect leaving the
premises before firearms resources were in place.
Recommendation HMIC
To review existing procedures and training for carrying out
assessments for operations of this nature incorporating lessons
learnt from this incident
Operational considerations
6] Concern
There was a substantial delay between the time the firearms team
were requested and when they were deployed. By the time Mr De
Menezes left Scotia Road at 09:33hrs CO19 officers were still not
in place despite being initially requested at 05:05hrs.
Recommendation HMIC
To review existing policy and practice to ensure that when, in
pursuance of an armed operation, it is necessary to stop or
otherwise detain potential subjects of a surveillance operation
appropriate firearms support is in place to expedite a prompt and
safe resolution of the encounter.
7] Concern
There was a lack of clarity about the command to 'stop'
the suspect given the likely mindset of the firearms officers.
They were deployed on an anti terrorist operation the day after
unsuccessful attempts were made to cause explosions within the
underground system. They had been issued with special ammunition.
They knew a Designated Senior Officer was in command.
Recommendation HMIC
To review existing policy and guidance to ensure absolute clarity
exists in the use of operationally specific terminology.
Particular attention is to be paid to ensuring the terminology
used for deployments under the auspices of Operations Kratos and
Operation C are entirely consistent with the common language of
command for regular firearms deployments in response to serious
crime operations.
SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS
8] Concern
The S012 surveillance team, the CO19 Specialist Firearms Officers
and those in command were not used to working together and were
not sufficiently familiar with each others working practices.
Recommendation HMIC
To review existing policy and operational capability in relation
to the deployment of surveillance teams on firearms operations to
ensure that deployment fully complements and supports rapid armed
intervention should such subsequently become necessary.
9] Concern
It was only the views of the surveillance team leader that were
communicated in relation to the identification of the suspect. The
fact that two surveillance officers believed that the person being
followed was not the suspect should have been communicated to the
Designated Senior Officer as it may have assisted her decision making.
Recommendation HMIC
To review existing policy and practice to ensure joint firearms
and surveillance operations are fully integrated and that channels
exist to ensure salient developments, such as doubts over a
target's identity, can be swiftly communicated to relevant
strategic and operational commanders.
10] Concern
The completion of the supplementary surveillance log has been
proved to involve alterations which changed the meaning of the entry.
Recommendation HMIC
To review existing policy and practice to ensure that at a
corporate level robust facilities and processes exist to
demonstrate the integrity of evidence gathered during the course
of surveillance operations. Particular attention should be paid
to the continued utility of surveillance logs.
POST INCIDENT MANAGEMENT
11] Concern
The incident was not referred until 15:21hrs on Monday 25 July
and until that time the IPCC was prevented from starting an
investigation on the instruction of the Commissioner of the
Metropolitan Police. The rationale given by the Commissioner for
this decision relating to the IPCC's powers and duties was
not correct.
At the present time the Police (Complaints and Misconduct)
Regulations 2004 require the police to refer complaints and
allegations of misconduct that are subject to mandatory referral
(such as death and serious injuries) to the IPCC no later than the
end of the working day following the day on which the complaint
was made or the conduct came to the attention of the appropriate authority.
Recommendation Home Office
That all mandatory referrals to the IPCC should occur,
particularly in the case of death or serious injury, as soon as
possible but in any event not later than the end of the day
following the following the incident, complaint or misconduct and
that the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2004
should be amended accordingly.
12] Concern
The difference in the treatment of police and civilian witnesses
to this incident are not acceptable or justifiable. Members of the
public were expected to be interviewed and make statements soon
after witnessing a most traumatic incident without being able
confer with other witnesses and provide a joint account. The
police officers involved were allowed to return to their own base,
refresh themselves and confer. This was and is accepted
practice.
However, the IPCC has raised its concerns regarding
the post incident procedures put in place after other incidents
where police firearms are
discharged.
Recommendation HMIC
To review existing guidance and practice to ensure that
appropriate and robust mechanisms exist to secure an accurate and
auditable record of 'hot' and team/group debriefs.
13] Concern
Officers involved in the incident wrote up their notes together.
This is current practice but makes those accounts less credible.
Such practices were agreed in the protocol between the police
service and the IPCC in July 2004.
Recommendation ACPO
To review efficacy of existing post incident management policy,
guidance and practice to ensure an appropriate balance exists
between being rightly held to account for one's actions
whilst discharging the office of Constable and the rights of the
principal officers. Particular attention should be paid to the
need to ensure that individual accounts are obtained in a
proximate and transparent manner that is consistent with the rules
of evidence, the duty of care to staff and the need to secure
public confidence. Post-incident procedures should be revised to
ensure that officers do not write up their notes together.
COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE
14] Concern
Command and control of this incident was inevitably lost when
CO19 officers entered the underground. Had there been any update
regarding the uncertainty surrounding the identification at this
point it would have been impossible to communicate.
Recommendation MPS
That in collaboration with partners in Transport for London and
British Transport Police the Metropolitan Police Service undertake
to ensure that communications are harmonised and facilitate the
command and control of operations conducted within the London
Underground network.
TRAINING AND EXERCISES
15] Concern
Events during July 2005 confronted the Metropolitan Police
Service with a series of challenges that had not been experienced
before. Whilst terrorist attacks on the transport system had been
predicted, the MPS relied on the ACPO Firearms manual and the
Kratos policy to combat such an attack. It is apparent that more
was required. The IPCC wants to ensure that police service and
individual police officers have learnt as much as possible from
the events of 22 July and have the best possible preparation for
dealing with similar situations in future.
Recommendation HMIC
The MPS, HMIC, ACPO, NPIA, Home Office
and other relevant agencies should revise planning, exercises and
training provided for those involved in anti-terrorist policing to
ensure such processes fully incorporate all the learning from the
events of 22 July.
As soon as legal procedures permit, the experience of those
officers directly involved, including staff from the IPCC should
be fed into those reviews.
COMMUNITY REASSURANCE
16] Concern
The IPCC has noted the positive response given by members of the
Community Reference Group and other community representatives to
the steps taken by the then Lambeth Borough Commander and other
statutory bodies to provide community reassurance in the aftermath
of all the events in July 2005. The IPCC witnessed some of this at
first hand. We commend Chief Superintendent Martin BRIDGER and his
officers for an excellent job facing the communities directly,
listening to their concerns and seeking to restore their
confidence. It was reported to us that this had been achieved as a
result of the community police liaison arrangements.
Recommendation HMIC
The good practice in place in Lambeth which ensured effective
community reassurance should be noted by the MPS and HMIC. Steps
should be taken to ensure that where appropriate, this good
practice is replicated in other BCUs.
* The recommendations can be found in the IPCC report
'Stockwell One Investigation into the shooting of Jean
Charles de Menezes at Stockwell underground station on 22 July
2005.' The report can be found at
http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/index/resources/evidence_reports/investigation_reports/ipcc_resources_stockwellone.htm
ENDS
Notes to Editors
The judicial review citation: * In the High Court of Justice,
Queen's Bench Division Administrative Court - The Queen on
the application of Independent Police Complaints Commission and
Assistant Commissioner Hayman and 1) PC Bell 2) PC Wakeling 3)
Anthony Housedon 4) Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis.
The IPCC has overall responsibility for the police complaints
system. Since April 2006 it has taken on responsibility for
similar, serious complaints against HM Revenue and Customs and the
Serious Organised Crime Agency in England and Wales.
The IPCC has the task of increasing public confidence in the
complaint systems and aims to make investigations more open,
timely, proportionate and fair.
The 16 Commissioners who run the IPCC guarantee its independence
and by law can never have served as police officers. No
Commissioner has worked for HM Revenue and Customs. They are
supported by more than more than 200 independent IPCC
investigators, casework managers and other specialists.
Since April 1 2004 the IPCC has used its powers to begin 171
independent and 533 managed investigations into the most serious
complaints against the police. It has set new standards for police
forces to improve the way the public's complaints are
handled. The Commission also handles appeals by the public about
the way their complaint was dealt with by the local force.
The IPCC is committed to getting closer to the communities it
serves. Its Commissioners and staff are based in IPCC regional
offices in Cardiff, Coalville, London and Sale plus a sub office
in Wakefield.
The IPCC web site is constantly updated at http://www.ipcc.gov.uk or
members of the public can contact the IPCC on 08453 002 002.