Ministry of Defence
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MoD publishes HMS Tireless board of inquiry
The MoD published today the Board of Inquiry (BOI) report into the tragic loss of two Royal Naval Submariners, and the injury of a third, following an explosion onboard HMS Tireless on 21 March 2007. The two personnel who died onboard HMS Tireless were Leading Operator Mechanic Paul McCann and Operator Mechanic Anthony Huntrod.
The BOI concluded that the explosion onboard the submarine was caused by a faulty self-contained oxygen generator (SCOG) - part of the back-up oxygen generation system - which was lit during a routine drill.
The Board has not determined precisely what caused the oxygen generator to explode. Their report identified the most likely cause as significant internal contamination of the SCOG canister with oil, possibly exacerbated by cracking within the canister. The BOI concluded that the contamination could have occurred in storage on land or onboard submarines, with the latter being the most likely source.
Des Browne, Secretary of State for Defence, said:
"At what I realise is a very difficult time, I would like to express my deepest sympathies to the families, friends and colleagues of the two submariners who died. I would also like to apologise to them for those departmental failings identified by the Board of Inquiry which contributed to this tragic incident. The Board of Inquiry report made a number of recommendations, all of which have been accepted and are being implemented. I would like to make clear that everything possible is being done to ensure that this cannot happen again."
Admiral Sir Jonathon Band, First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff, said:
"The loss of any member of the Royal Navy is felt deeply across the entire Service and I would like to pass on my sympathies, and those of the rest of the Royal Navy, to the families, friends and colleagues of Leading Operator Maintainer Paul McCann and Operator Maintainer Anthony Huntrod, who died in this tragic accident.
"I would also like to pay tribute to the sheer professionalism demonstrated by Ship's Company of HMS Tireless in what were very challenging circumstances and which ensured that the submarine initially surfaced from under the ice and was then brought back to port safely. Their courage and teamwork reinforces my confidence in the ability of the personnel of the submarine flotilla to uphold the highest standards of the Service. They can all be justifiably proud of their actions."
Following the HMS Tireless incident, the Department restricted the use of SCOGs in all submarines to emergency use only. The BOI has subsequently made 35 recommendations to ensure safety measures are incorporated. Implementation of these recommendations is underway and progress has been made. Since the incident, the Royal Navy and MoD have:
* issued more detailed guidance on SCOG hazards;
* improved
SCOG quality-control checks; and
* issued stricter
instructions for SCOG storage, transport and stowage.
The Royal Navy's submarine flotilla maintains full operational capability and capacity.
Notes to Editors:
1. Self-Contained Oxygen Generators (SCOGs) are designed primarily for the provision of oxygen to survivors of disabled submarines, but they are also used to maintain oxygen levels when the main oxygen generators are offline. In normal and tactical operating situations, oxygen is produced by Low Pressure Electrolysers (LPEs), which generate oxygen throughout the submarine. In certain situations though - such as an escape scenario or in under-ice operations where low sea water temperatures affect LPE availability - SCOGS can be employed to maintain correct oxygen levels within submarines.
2. The next of kin have been kept informed of the BOI's findings throughout the process and have received today a copy of the redacted BOI report. The redacted BOI report can be found on the MOD website (from 1215) at: http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/BoardsOfInquiry/
