WIREDGOV

Frenetic diplomacy over the past week has set up potential talks between Presidents Zelenskyy and Putin. But so far this is a triumph of diplomatic process rather than concrete progress, and it is far from certain that an end to the fighting is near, with much to clarify on Western ‘security guarantees.’

President Zelenskyy might justifiably feel pleased that his meetings in the US this week have resulted in headlines on security guarantees, with images of European leaders standing by his side. The contrast could hardly be more stark with the shouting match into which his previous visit descended, especially as that was followed by a temporary hiatus in US intelligence support to Ukraine. But this is a low bar to clear, and after these talks and the discussions in Alaska between Presidents Trump and Putin, there is still much to clarify in terms of international support for Ukraine, and the extent to which this will make an end to the fighting more likely.

The Fog of Negotiations

The issue of the day is what form any ‘security guarantees’ for Ukraine will take, and what the means of enforcement will be. It is not immediately obvious what was discussed with the Russians in Alaska, nor to what they agreed. The fact that so many European leaders travelled to the US on Monday and highlighted the issue suggests significant concern over the shifting US position, but also a sense that an opportunity might have presented itself. This followed the evolution of President Trump’s position over the weekend, from threatening sanctions or ‘very severe consequences’ if Russia didn’t agree to a ceasefire, to talking about a peace deal (with fighting still continuing in the meantime).

In spite of some optimistic headlines suggesting a deployment of US forces to ‘protect’ Ukraine, Trump was clear that Europe was the ‘first line of defence’ for Ukraine, a stance consistent with his desire to shift more of the responsibility on to European countries for security in their own ‘backyard’. European leaders have continued to develop their ‘Coalition of the Willing’, but the form and function of a European force now seems to have been scaled back from some of the early ambitions. That deterrent force, which might have had a land component of around divisional strength (15,000-20,000 personnel) was feasible from within European combat power, but only if backed by significant willpower and resources, and – in the short-term – at a cost to other NATO commitments.

Click here for the full press release