WIREDGOV

The legacy of the UK’s involvement in Afghanistan is one of compounding whole-of-government failure.

The fourth Anglo-Afghan conflict (2001-21) is a dark period in British military history which is getting bleaker. The continuing impact of the conflict on UK national security stems from a refusal to confront and learn from the past. The 2025 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) focus was to reconstitute UK warfighting capability to deter and defeat Russia. However, the legacy of Afghanistan will continue to jeopardise this vision unless the British State owns – and learns from – its mistakes.

Compounding Failures

The UK spent an estimated £22.9 billion (£32.8 billion when adjusted for inflation) on Afghanistan between 2001 and 2021, with the latest data leak reportedly costing an additional £850 million. For this reason alone, the British public deserve accountability, but there are multiple reasons why the UK must be held to account for its actions. Added up, they amount to a comprehensive British whole-of-system failure.

First, the 2001-14 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) failed to secure the country for the new Afghan government to govern. The UK contingent – Operation Herrick – was a war of choice which lacked a single campaign strategy and ignored the master principle of war – the selection and maintenance of the aim. As such, mission creep expanded the operation which, at times, included counter insurgency, counter terrorism, stabilisation, humanitarian aid and counter narcotics. As an example, since the Taliban regained control of the country, between 2022 and 2023, poppy cultivation under the Taliban reduced by more than 99%. The UK talked of counter insurgency but never got anywhere near the development and reconstruction resources required, mainly because the security operation was consistently underpowered.

Concepts of operations were changed every six months as new Brigades rotated through and new Commanders wanted to make their mark. Most operations were ground holding, but Helmand was never vital ground or key terrain – either for ISAF or the Taliban. The 2006 decision to widely expand ISAF across the country was led by the UK, alongside Canada and the Netherlands as the US was distracted in Iraq. In a uniquely British fashion, insufficient resources were allocated. The original combat estimate for the size of force needed for Helmand in 2006 was a brigade, but Permanent Joint Headquarters asked the planners to revise down to a battle group. The MoD then made a hollow virtue of getting on with the tools it had and became isolated in checkpoints of peripheral value across the green zone. British operations between 2007 and 2014 were in effect one very long withdrawal operation. Like in Iraq, UK forces in the south were ultimately bailed out by US reinforcements.

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