WIREDGOV

EXPERT COMMENT

US actions in Venezuela and its identification of the Western Hemisphere as a US sphere of influence presents a complex set of challenges for China.

Just days after the US attack on Venezuela, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio put Washington’s definition of its sphere of influence beyond doubt. ‘This is the Western Hemisphere. This is where we live – and we’re not going to allow the Western Hemisphere to be a base of operation for adversaries, competitors, and rivals of the United States’.

China has a staunchly different view. Months before the US attack on Venezuela, Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi, told a forum in Beijing that Latin America and the Caribbean are not anyone’s ‘backyard’.

In fact, China’s diplomatic and commercial relationship with Latin America has burgeoned over the past two decades. In 2024, Chinese trade with the region grew to a record $518bn and some economists have predicted it could exceed $700bn by 2035. China currently ranks as Latin America’s second largest trade partner after the US. Investment ties are growing fast. 

Chinese financial institutions have also offered an estimated $303bn in financing across the region between 2000 and 2023, according to the AidData research institute. This is far more than US institutions have lent.

At a 2025 meeting of the China–CELAC forum, a Beijing-led body that brings together 33 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, President Xi Jinping announced a new credit line in excess of $9bn to the region for cooperation projects. The loans are to be denominated in the Chinese renminbi – demonstrating Beijing’s efforts to divert its international lending programme away from the US dollar. 

Click here to continue reading the full version of this Expert Comment on the Chatham House website.