WIREDGOV

The Defence Investment Plan shows where more money may go. The harder test is whether ministers can show how spending, assets, maintenance and liabilities become readiness.

The publication of the Defence Investment Plan has answered one question and sharpened another. Ministers have set out where much of the next wave of defence money is meant to go. But the harder question is whether the system can show how that money will become effective military capacity.

Britain’s defence debate is still dominated by inputs. How quickly should spending rise? Should the target be 2.5%, 2.7%, 3% or 3.5% of GDP? How much more will be needed to meet the Russian threat, reassure NATO allies and adapt to a less certain American security guarantee?

These are serious questions. The next government will almost certainly need to find more money for defence. But a larger defence budget does not automatically produce more defence capability. Modern war has made that clear. Readiness depends not only on platforms and weapons systems, but on whether Britain can sustain, repair, replenish and adapt them through munitions stocks, drone production, shipyards, depots, air defence, training areas, resilient bases, service housing, logistics and industrial surge capacity.

The Defence Investment Plan should therefore be judged not only by whether it allocates enough money, but also by whether it helps Parliament, the Treasury, the services and the public see how money becomes capacity – and whether that capacity becomes military power.

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