WIREDGOV

July’s attacks by Israel and the US have set back – without completely removing – Iran’s capability to develop a nuclear weapon. But simply rebuilding the programme won’t be enough for a nuclear deterrent.

More than a month after the Israeli and US attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities and scientists, the full extent of the damage to the Iranian nuclear programme remains unclear. Intelligence assessments vary. Despite the Trump White House’s assertions that the military strikes ‘obliterated’ Iran’s nuclear programme, US and even Israeli intelligence assessments are more conservative. The Pentagon and Israeli officials have estimated that the programme has been set back by up to two years; another US intelligence assessment suggests that Iran could start enriching uranium again in a matter of months. Broadly speaking, the consensus appears to be that the programme has not, in fact, been definitively destroyed.

Yet, the exact extent of the material damage to the programme is secondary. As others have detailed, Iran does not have to reconstitute the whole of its programme to be able to produce a nuclear weapon and could, in fact, probably do so relatively quickly, should it decide to. The more important – and, arguably, more challenging – question is over the impact of the ‘twelve-day war’ on Iran’s assessments and decision-making as to the value and feasibility of developing a credible nuclear deterrent.

The Drive for the Ultimate Deterrent

Recent developments have probably reinforced incentives for Iran to pursue a nuclear weapon, which predate the recent escalation in violence. Namely, the attacks have made painfully clear the ineffectiveness of Iran’s other capabilities to deter and defend against attacks on its territory. Iran has historically relied on a strategy of ‘forward defence’, using proxies and allies across the Middle East to help ensure that threats to its security were kept away from Iran’s borders. Its missile capabilities were meant to serve as an additional deterrent against attack and as a recourse for dealing with threats away from Iranian territory.

In light of the Israeli degradation of both Hamas and Hizbullah and following the underwhelming performance of Iranian missiles in direct exchanges with Israel in 2024, the limitations of both aspects of Iran’s ‘forward defence’ strategy have become clear. At the same time, the failure of Iranian air and missile defence in defending against Israeli and US attacks – during the ‘twelve-day war’ and in earlier exchanges – have further highlighted Iran’s vulnerability.

Furthermore, whereas Tehran may have previously assumed that a near-threshold nuclear programme would be sufficient to deter attacks against its territory, the events that have unfolded since 13 July will have disabused Tehran of that belief. The scale of the Israeli attacks, the range of targets that were hit, and the willingness of the US to actively support Israeli military action against Iran will have reinforced the credibility and seriousness of the military threat Iran faces from its adversaries, already a problem in a regime that mixes paranoia into its desire to survive. Veiled threats – both by Israeli and US leadership – against Iran’s Supreme Leader and the regime as a whole will further aggravate threat perceptions in Iran, even if the US is now back to focussing on talks.

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